With Auckland Transport announcing yesterday that they have selected a preferred route for the City Rail Link, this might be a good time to highlight some work that various bloggers on this site have been doing to build up a top quality repository for information on this project. In particular, this post shows what’s in the “Alternatives to CRL” page, which focuses not only on different alignments for the project but also on what other transport options exist to help achieve what the CRL looks to achieve – and how effective (or otherwise) those alternatives would be. Because of that, this is not really my blog post (only this introduction), but rather draws from the knowledge of all bloggers on this site, as well as our former admin as much of the page has taken snippets from past posts.
The Process of Assessing Alternatives:
One of the things which often comes up in analysis of the City Rail Link project is whether there’s a better/cheaper/quicker alternative which we should be investigating further instead of pursuing with the CRL in its currently proposed form. This is a very valid issue, as sound transport planning requires a thorough and robust assessment of alternatives to make sure we’re spending a very significant sum of money on the right thing.
Various elements make up a robust assessment of alternatives:
- Is heavy rail the right technology/mode, or should we be looking at something else? (light-rail, busway, on-street buses, monorail etc.)
- Should the project be above ground, under-ground or at grade?
- What alternative alignments are there?
- How many stations should there be and what alternative station locations are there?
- Is the “do nothing/minimum” a feasible option? For how long?
- Are there a number of smaller/cheaper projects that could delay the need for a really big/expensive project?
Broad Alternative Assessment:
Before we get down to analysing the ‘short-list’ of genuine possible alternatives to the CRL, it is worth noting that a longer list of broad options have been looked at in the past. The project has a very long history, beginning at least as far back as the 1920s [history page will elaborate on this in the future], but the current push for completion began around a decade ago – leading to a 2004 study that looked at a number of different routes, building on earlier work which had analysed light-rail alternatives before preferring the “westwards extension of Britomart”.
The preferred alignment in the 2004 study is relatively similar to the currently preferred option – although without the deviation to Newton Station we have now:
The red lines indicate alternative alignments that were looked at.
More recently, the 2010 Business Case included a whole paper dedicated to alternatives analysis. The paper goes right back to first principles in looking at options such as increasing road capacity, building a CRL but with fewer (or no) stations, relying solely on ferries, cycling, walking or buses, different bus options and so on. Here’s a brief look at the ‘longer list’ of options that were considered:
The business case identified four options worth exploring further:
- On-street bus solution
- Bus tunnel
- Expanded Britomart station
- City Rail Link
In more recent times we have seen other options thrown into the mix. For example, an overhead option was suggested by the Greenways Project. Most of the alternatives have fundamental problems with them, such as the overheard option being too steep for conventional heavy rail.
This page is going to look in more detail at the three most viable alternatives to the City Rail Link project: an on-street bus solution, a bus tunnel and an expanded Britomart station.
On-street bus solution:
Without the CRL in place, the number of passengers needing to catch the bus into Auckland’s city centre will significantly increase over time. The diagram below shows this trend, in the scenario of there being no CRL and bus capacity in the city centre being unconstrained (which obviously it isn’t):
The exact numbers are obviously just a guess, but what’s important is the clear trend: we’re going to need to deal with around a doubling of bus passengers by 2041 heading into the city centre if we don’t build the CRL. An ironic result of that is likely to be significantly fewer cars being able to get into town because many of the streets will have to be given over to being for buses only – to accommodate such higher numbers.
So how might the city centre handle such a large number of buses? The thinking about where buses should go in the city centre has evolved a lot in the last couple of years, but the CRL’s original assessment of alternative makes some sensible suggestions which are still valid – and give us some idea of the huge number of buses the city centre would need to handle:
It’s important to point out, obviously, that the CRL does not reduce the need for North Shore buses. However, by significantly reducing the number of buses from Great North Road and from Symonds Street/Central Connector, buses from the North Shore will not conflict with those other buses and have a lot more city centre streetspace available for them.
Given that standard bus lanes can only handle around 100 buses per hour, what kind of infrastructure upgrades will be necessary in the event we don’t build the City Rail Link? The alternative assessment highlighted a few things that might be necessary:
- Completion of the Waitemata Harbour Crossing project to establish bus lanes on Auckland Harbour Bridge (both directions), along with a structure to allow buses to access the Northern Busway via an Onewa flyover and bus lanes on the SH1 off-ramp to Cook Street; two-way operation of Cook Street as well as a new on-ramp from Cook Street westbound to the SH1 ramp. (Arguably this project is independent of the CRL although its need would probably be higher in the event CRL isn’t built).
- A 350m tunnel (approx) from Cook street beneath Nelson and Hobson Streets to overcome grade and intersection constraints
- Bus rapid transit corridors, station and grade-separated junctions. These are assumed to require property acquisition along their length to achieve additional corridor width.
- Reconfiguration of Britomart Bus Station to concentrate passenger activities in Queen Elizabeth Square
- Bus lanes on Mayoral Drive and Cook Street in both directions
- Wellesley Street converted to Bus Only between Symonds Street and Nelson Street
- Bus lanes required on Nelson and Hobson Streets between Cook and Wellesley
- A new surface bus station in Civic on Mayoral Drive and Queen Street
- Additional buses and bus operational costs associated with an average 88% increase in buses operating to the CBD
Aside from the cost and disruption of constructing this infrastructure, the impact of it all on the urban quality of the city centre would be immense. Wider streets, reduced general access, big bus stations in a number of areas, a whole pile more buses and so forth does not seem like a very pedestrian friendly environment.
Along with other possible ‘on street bus solutions’ it is the impact on the quality of the urban environment which makes such options a non-starter.
Bus Tunnel:
Perhaps a more realistic alternative than on-street buses is the idea of a full-scale bus tunnel travelling across the city centre. This tunnel would link with the Northern Busway in the north and then into Upper Symonds Street at its southern end.
The bus tunnel itself can accommodate extremely high frequencies of buses along its route – as long as sufficient space is provided at the various stations for buses to pick up and drop off passengers. The assessment of alternatives noted that upwards of 500 buses per hour could be accommodated, although some buses would still need to travel on the surface streets (like with the CRL). Because of a need for shoulders and fire exits, the width of the bus tunnel would probably be greater than that required for the CRL – which obviously has some cost implications. The width requirement is detailed in the alternative assessment:
A two-lane CBD bus tunnel would have ample capacity to accommodate the expected up to 534 bus movements per hour (two directions) assuming no crashes or breakdowns. The capacity constraint for the bus tunnel would be the operation of the bus stations as well as the level of traffic congestion on the shared road corridors beyond the tunnel. Efficient operation of the bus stations would be critical and would require active management of bus and pedestrian movements. Bus stations of this type are proven technology in New Zealand, though operating costs are high.
However a bus tunnel of this length would require safe exits in the case of fire, necessitating fire-proof separation. Each separate direction would then need to allow passing in the case of breakdowns, so would probably need to be two lanes, implying two by two-lane tunnels.
This leads to the following cost comparison between the CRL and the bus tunnel alternative:
So the bus tunnel is more expensive to build. But even that doesn’t truly highlight the real problem with this alternative. That is more about how it interacts with the existing transport network – especially at its southern end where 500 or so buses per hour are disgorged onto a number of local roads: requiring some pretty serious pieces of infrastructure for this all to make sense. Necessary supporting bus priority infrastructure for the tunnel are shown in the diagram below:
The purple lines aren’t much of a problem as under all scenarios in the future we’re going to need high quality bus lanes along these roads (we already have them in a few places). The issue is more with the blue lines – which show the need for full busway standard priority along extensive portions of New North Road, Khyber Pass Road and Great South Road. As well as being expensive, disruptive and politically difficult to build, the really stupid thing about the necessary busways is that they duplicate the rail corridor. When you have a piece of high quality rapid transit infrastructure (the existing railway lines) it seems to make a lot more sense to squeeze the most you can out of them rather than building completely new duplicative pieces of rapid transit infrastructure right next to them.
And it is for that fundamental reason, along with the higher cost of construction compared to the CRL, the bus tunnel alternative doesn’t make sense.
Expanded Britomart Station:
The final serious alternative to the City Rail Link relates to finding ways to expand the capacity of Britomart station by means other than making it a through station and linking up with the western line at Mt Eden. There are a few ways this could be done. Back in 2010 Nick explained one way: by constructing what would effectively be another mini-station and feeding tunnel underneath Quay Street. This new station could eventually link into the CRL, but in the meanwhile the extra platforms and extra tracks into this newly expanded Britomart would probably buy some time before the station reached full capacity – thereby delaying the need for the project:
Nick has said that this idea is more about looking at the best long-term rail solution rather than finding a way to avoid the need for the CRL – as obviously just building the new platforms and the tunnel under Quay Street doesn’t do three critical things that the CRL does:
- Improve rail access to more of the city centre through the construction of new stations
- Significantly reduce travel times from the Western Line to the city centre as trains no longer need to travel via Newmarket
- Remove/reduce conflicting train movements at Newmarket, which themselves are a constraint on the capacity of the rail network
Another plan for expanding Britomart’s capacity was looked at in the assessment of alternatives that accompanied the original business case – which involved building a third line between Newmarket and Britomart. This option obviously involves some pretty serious infrastructure requirements (extra tunnels and bridges) and the widening of the tunnel into Britomart, which is generally understood to be near impossible due to buildings being constructed in very close proximity to it. And once again, even if possible, simply increasing the track capacity into Britomart does not solve the other three main goals of the CRL. The difficulty of widening the Britomart trench/tunnel as well as this option not achieving many of the things the CRL does achieve (as noted above) make this option not really worth it.
The “do nothing” option:
In any good assessment of alternatives, it’s always important to consider the “do nothing” or “do minimum” option. In some respects this option might be similar to the surface bus routes above, but without the necessary infrastructure constructed or the necessary bus lanes set aside, for that option to really work. What we are likely to see in the “do nothing” scenario is the stagnation of Auckland’s city centre as it becomes increasingly difficult to access, and an increasingly unattractive place to live, work or visit.
Employment will be pushed elsewhere in the region – meaning far less productivity as agglomeration benefits will be foregone. With fewer people wanting to live in the city centre (due to its congested and polluted nature) that will put more pressure on either other suburbs having to intensify or will see more urban sprawl happening.
Efforts to improve the city centre’s pedestrian focus will be in vain – with the streets needing to be used by buses and cars so much it simply won’t be possible to free up space for wider footpaths, linear parks, shared spaces and all the other fantastic ideas put forward in the Council’s City Centre Master Plan.
And the trains will become increasingly crowded, yet operated in an inefficient way because of this one big bottleneck on the system. We’ll have railway lines capacity of handling a train every minute or two only utilised to around 10% of their capacity – while our roading network gets overloaded.
None of this sounds acceptable at all – why is why the do nothing option really isn’t an option either.
The City Rail Link:
At the end of the day, almost by way of a process of elimination, the CRL really is the only viable, feasible and attractive option out of all the above. Yes it’s an expensive project, but as this page shows there isn’t a cheaper and easier option out there which provides the same benefits (or even close to it).
Read about the benefits of the City Rail Link
Return to main City Rail Link page


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the real issue of a bus tunnel is emissions, Seattle’s transit tunnel (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Downtown_Seattle_Transit_Tunnel ) was initially opened for buses and used dual mode diesel plus trolley buses
now it has LRT in the tunnel as well and the overhead was incompatible, so they’ve switched to low emissions hybrid buses
so you’d either need a series of huge (and I mean MASSIVE) ventilation towers throughout the CBD, or buses dragging around one redundant power train at all times
despite all the funding controversy, the CRL is still the best option by far
You’re right Steve that it’s only though seeing how utterly horrific all the alternatives are that you realise the CRL’s true value.
It would be nice if Jim Mora on RNZ (who seems to have an anti-PT bee in his bonnet) just for once dropped his concerned troll act and actually interviewed more than the same anti-CRL cranks on his show – http://podcast.radionz.co.nz/aft/aft-20120704-1607-the_panel_with_bernard_hickey_and_tim_watkin_part_1-048.mp3 conversation on the CRL starts about 60% of the way in.
Just a small thing, but I reckon you should increase the line across the top that includes CRL at the top of the blog. Slightly larger (25-50%) and it becomes a lot more noticeable.
As I have already outlined in great detail (http://www.kiwiblog.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Auckland-CBD-Rail-Link-BC-Bus-Tunnel-Cost-Review-final-DRAFT-111026.pdf), I do not agree with the CBD Rail Link Business Case alternatives analysis or your uncritical support of these flawed numbers.
It must first be noted that Auckland Transport initially suppressed the detailed costings in refused to provide the Benefit/Cost calculation spreadsheet. However, the Ombudsman upheld my complaint and I got the information anyway.
A good thing too because among the many issues with the CBD Rail Link benefit cost analysis. Issues identified included:
* two major spreadsheet calculation errors, one that reduced the rail option operating cost and one that increased the bus option operating cost. You should at least admit to obvious calculation errors and adjust your figures accordingly.
* design elements that are described as being necessary are missing from the rail costs costing (such as $240M to properly connect the North Shore Busway into the CBD streets to handle the estimated 332 buses per hour in 2041).
* I found that the bus tunnel described throughout the business case as “a 2-lane tunnel” actually costed as TWO 2-Lane tunnels. The justification outlined by the Business Case and repeated by you is totally without foundation . . . neither the Seattle or the Brisbane bus tunnels need TWO 2-lane tunnels and I challenge you to find any example of this anywhere in the world !
However, the most important error is that the CBD Rail Link option assumes bus patronage will increase from 23,180 (2011) to 42,814 (2041) WITH NO INVESTMENT AT ALL. Either you can actually add 20,000 bus passengers/day for $0 in which case why bother spending $2.8B on a rail tunnel or you have to invest some serious $$s in busways anyway in which case the rail tunnel option will cost even more than even the current estimate. You can’t have it both ways.
I like the bus tunnel because it provides a superior rapid transit service to a greater number of Aucklanders at a lower cost. I like the bus tunnel because it takes 80% of PT commuters off CBD surface streets compared to only 37% for the rail tunnel. I don’t oppose the rail tunnel because I am against improving the rail network but because the bus service must move the greater numbers (43K vs 25K) and so should be first to get the investment. The Auckland CBD streets clearly cannot cope with the 1,000 buses/day needed if the rail link proceeds which is why they should be put underground. My approach was to cost 1/2 the identified buswasy costs into the rail option to handle this issue. However, if you do this (surprise, surprise) the rail tunnel cost jumps above the bus tunnel cost.
Finally, it is highly ironic that, even including the above errors, the Business Case costed the bus tunnel option at $2.6B. Now the revised CBD Rail tunnel cost has risen from $1.6B to an estimate now stated to be $2.9B. This is MORE than the bus tunnel cost estimate !! Has anyone not noticed that this alone should have led to a relook at the bus tunnel as it is now clearly the lowest cost rapid transit option 😉
Who are the CRL “losers”
What I find interesting is the CRL has very few negatives. Who would “lose” from having this? The people who will never get out of cars will have clearer streets and motorways (so why does AA oppose it), no one is going to be moving house, business will probably return to buildings post build.Central Auckland will be bigger due to the new railway stations. Even the competitors, the bus companies being the most obvious, are probably going to benefit. Very few other large projects manage not to hurt people this much.
There aren’t really any losers, the only downside is the fact it isn’t free.
There is an assumption (probably valid) pervading this blog that someone else (rather than those who benefit from it) will pay for the capital cost of CRL and a substantial portion of the operating costs. Since we don’t yet know who these someones are it is hard to identify who the “losers” are going to be.
Just the same ‘someone else’ who pays for the motorways, only in this case only paying for half of it.
Ah, I see…so we should compound the problem?
Not sure what you mean?
Have that someone else pay for a few less motorways (i.e. don’t build them) and direct the money instead to the CRL.
They’ll never know the difference…..
I think you have the assumption wrong MFD. I’d say the assumption around here is more like “the whole city will benefit greatly from the CRL so it’s appropriate for it to be paid for and operated by Auckland ratepayers in general. Plus something that benefits Auckland is good for the national economy, so a large contribution of capital from central government is appropriate”
That is the same argument used for our funding structures from motorways and local roads, but I think the general benefits to the economy are actually much greater with the CRL in comparison to most recent motorway proposals.
In that case the only real losers are the few property owners around the southern portal who will be forced to sell.
You make the same assumption that Len Brown makes ie Auckland = urban Auckland.
More than 80% of the Auckland Council’s territory is rural and it may come as some surprise to you that many of the inhabitants (who are also Auckland ratepayers) seldom use the state highways or the railways or buses (there aren’t any) nor do they make their livings in the urban areas or even set foot in them from 1 month to the next. Even Brown’s “vision” excludes those rural areas. The Auckland Plan, however, makes it clear that the one of the primary roles is to keep the area nice and green for the city folks to recreate in and to supply food and water to its inhabitants. The plan gives lip service to sustainability without questioning the effect of high rates of population growth on sustainability.
The assumption that intensification in the CBD is somehow much better for the country’s economy than intensification in NZ’s other cities is highly questionable (insofar as it isn’t even considered in the “do-minimum” scenario) as is the assumption that 60% of population growth for NZ will occur in Auckland (it won’t and we can be sure of that) and should be encouraged to do so. It resembles a zero-sum game. The Cost-Benefit analysis in the CBD business case really does make some bold assumptions; not as whacky as those in the RONS cases but sufficiently whacky to make it unconvincing.
The assertion that there is no down side to the CRL is just woefully naive. Are we really being asked to believe that the NPV is infinite? If the taxpayer foots the bill does that make the cost go away somehow?
I actually think that the CRL will be a very good thing but overhyping and double (or even triple counting) the benefits and ignoring the cost is just unconvincing to a rational person, let alone the baying mass of naysayers.
It’s not an assumption, it’s a veritable fact. Auckland region is overwhelmingly urbanised: 94% of Aucklanders live inside the metropolitan urban limit. You’re 80% of wilderness and farmland is all but empty of ratepayers. There is a reason why huge swathes of the Auckland region have not state highways, railways or buses, it’s because there is almost nobody out there to serve.
My assertion that there is no downside to the CRL is simply based on the assumption that the economic benefits will significantly outweigh the costs (especially in comparison to alternatives), physical impacts are minimal and there are negligible long term social and environmental impacts.
“You’re 80% of wilderness and farmland”
Really? No need to resort to insults.
Sorry, but how is stating that 80% of the land area of Auckland is wilderness and farmland an insult? I didn’t realize that mentioning land use characteristics was a taboo topic.
You’re = you are. I thought it was funny. I resorted to humour instead of pointing out the arrogance of dismissing around 100,000 of Auckland’s population as irrelevant. I assumed that you had a sense of humour. I was wrong and I apologise.
Ah right, sorry didn’t get that! I do have a sense of humour but sometimes I’m a bit tardy on the uptake :/
I wasn’t dismissing the 100k Aucklanders that live outside the metro centre, I was dismissing the idea that land area was a good way to apportion needs or distribute funds.
It raises the issue, however, of why was the 80% of “farmland and wilderness” included within Auckland’s boundaries. The Royal Commission recommended it but never explained why. Brown compounds the problem with his vacuous “mission statement”.
Those who benefit from the CRL are the ones who should pay for it. The real question relates to understanding where those benefits fall. Reduced congestion, increased land values, more productive economy etc. etc.
Agreed! So lets make contributions voluntary, not through taxation. If people will benefit, they will be willing to contribute.
So let’s include roads in that as well.
But the vast majority of the economic benefits are non-excludable.
And I’m not sure on what planet people who benefit are willing to contribute, but it can’t be a human one. Can you honestly ever see the peak hour motorway commuters of Auckland lining up to voluntary pay for a rail tunnel that reduces congestion pressures on their choice of transport mode?
If most of the benefits are non-excludable, then you are saying that most of the benefits will not be to people actually catching the train, or land owners and businesses in the vicinity of rail stations. Thats an interesting point of view, and I don’t think it does much for the case that we should invest.
Re the motorway commuters. All you need to do is price the roads, then the money can simply go where the demand is. If everyone is willing to pay $20 a trip on the motorway, well we will have a lot more motorways. If at $10 a trip people are will to $7 to use the train, there will be more money available for rail.
Yes, I believe the bulk of the effects are systemic for the wider transport system and economy, with the minority of benefits actually going to rail passengers and landowners adjacent to stations.
One example might be that spending two billion on this will forgo the need to spend ten billion on motorway projects, in the same way that the $300 million Northern Busway has allowed $3 billion dollar plans for a harbour crossing to be mothballed indefinitely. The real benefit of that is still outside the transport sphere, mainly through not wasting several more billions of public funds on inefficient transport infrastructure that locks in future dependency on imported fuels. That comes straight out of the national bottom line.
I not sure why a project that benefits the whole city and the national economy doesn’t do much for the case for investment?
In both examples you cite, the issue is a lack of pricing. We wont “have” to spend $10b on motorways anymore than we would “have” to spend $10b on pinot noir, if we were giving it away by the case.
There’s also the small matter of the 2010 Business Case forecasting an increase in car travel to the CBD post CRL. At first glance the hapless car commuter could conclude that all that growth in the CBD has made the motorway congestion worse.
Sure, but feel free to try and get roads priced properly and see how far you get. Remember the drama we had over a simple 10c a litre fuel tax? As lovely as perfectly priced everything might be, I’d say we’ll have more luck building a rail tunnel to address the imbalance.
And get rid of all parking regulations… and properly price the environmental externalities of road transport.
Don’t worry about the trains guys. It will all be solved when we ALL have self driving, electric cars in 2017.
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/opinion/news/article.cfm?c_id=466&objectid=10817693
Seriously Jim Hopkins is a moron. He doesn’t understand that.
1. The uptake of these cars will take decades. I’m pretty sure my Honda Civic will still be alive in five years time. Incidentally it will be twenty years old by then.
2. These cars will still need road space and carparking. Something the city is already desperately short of.
3. What do we do for the few decades between then and total uptake of these vehicles when the benefits will start to become apparent?
4. Presumably you will still be required to have a license and know how to drive in case a failure occurs.
Funny how he also claims that cars are the 20th century’s greatest invention. The first practical cars were actually invented in the early years of the 19th century. Thats almost 100 years before the 20th century, and about the same time as railways became practical too.
They wont necessarily require parking, if the model ends up being that people dont own their own car, but just use them as taxis. This is obviously possible. In any case parking can be at a distance from the city centre. Also the lane capacity of driverless vehicles will be substantially more than the lane capacity of human operated vehicles, so they will be more economical in terms of road space. It may also be that we end up with a system with a lot of vehicle sharing/ mini bus type of operations. You just request a pick up in your phone and a driverless vehicle is sent your way.
It may take a couple of decades for uptake – the point is dont make massive investments that will only pay off after 100 years if they may be redundant in 20. We are doing ok right now.
Driverless vehicles are potentially going to be the most important technological improvement in our lifetimes.
This is just another one of these meaningless excuses to do nothing, except build roads because of course maybe driverless cars will make them more valuable in the future. In all honesty I’d rather be able to interact with the people around me by catching a train than sit in a metal box in traffic.
Swan the motorway system will have completely failed well before then. NZTA only give the 4billion they are spending on the Western Ring Route till 2026 at the outside. Why this desperation to only have one mode? The CRL is the best weapon to keep the roads we have and are building the last of flowing. It isn’t cars versus trains; they are complementory.
Hopkins is an idiot. And, ironically, the one with the out of date view no matter how he dresses it up in new technology; the total car approach is no solution to a city of Auckland’s size and quality.
I dont think there is any desperation about having a single mode, it is just that when you are going to make a large capital investment you want it to be worthwhile. NZTA predict unending traffic growth. They don’t price their product appropriately. The motorways are not at capacity for most of the time. I have been dogsitting this week and leaving work early, before the evening rush, and working from home. It has not affected my productivity one bit. If I was given even a modest incentive to do so I could make it a semi permanent choice.
Back in the late 19th century (and well into the 20th), Manchester had a reticulated public hydraulic power network. Its usage declined with the advent of electric power, and is no longer in operation today. I don’t here anyone talk about the lack of mode choice in power transmission these days.
Oh please, no motorway has ever been subjected to the level examination that the CRL has, this is the single most studied project ever considered in this country. Can we please have a little balance here. This is a transformational idea for Auckland which I guess is why it is not understood, but it is way more studied than the lazy reasoning used for lavish motorway spending. The only justification for that spending is that it is what we’ve always done…. Phaaark, lame. Please take your concerns about economic value to Transmission Gully and Puford.
Yeah I’m still waiting to see the first post-implementation review of a motorway project. Especially SH18, which seems completely empty most of the time.
“Hopkins is an idiot”
Well if that’s true then I guess we can discount everything he writes without even considering its voracity, can’t we?
Yes
Look, Hopkins is simply a man of a certain age living in provincial New Zealand. A place where the advantages of the car and the disadvantages of public transport is self evident. And that is all fine except why, on God’s earth, this makes him some kind of expert on what a growing metropolis of 1.5 million people should do I have no idea. He is stuck in the past and stuck in the countryside and should be happy with his lot except the Herald wheels him in as some kind authority on life in an actual city. It makes no sense, and yes he is an idiot in the talk back sense. He is a peddler of home truths of the kind that work just fine in the small village he represents but are irrelevant to the issue at hand.
You take the Herald too seriously. It’s a bit of a comic really.
Mr Anderson,
Do you have access to the business case for SH18? It may be feasible to conduct a rudimentry post-project analysis independently and use it as an example of bad practice in future consultation phases or maybe get one of the opposition parties to raise the issue in parliament. Some of NZTA’s justifications are very bad science and it’s time they were exposed as not acting in the best interests of the country.
So Jim Hopkins wants us to sit around for twenty five years in the hope an unproven technology that might not take off and that no one who likes to drive their car will adopt? And doesn’t he live in Christchurch anyway? What possible knowledge or expertise does he have about public transport in medium sized cities? It looks like he is a libertarian idiot with their typically stupid unreasoning ideological objection to trains to me. What he is proposing is the technology equivalent of a cargo cult. The only good thing about the Herald being online is I don’t have to pay to have my intelligence insulted.
My main concern is with the fundamental premise
“The exact numbers are obviously just a guess, but what’s important is the clear trend: we’re going to need to deal with around a doubling of bus passengers by 2041 heading into the city centre”
I agree its likely that there will be an increase,however if trends were easily predicted we’d all be millionaires so I put forward the suggestion that the ‘clear trend’ will only last until it stops.
Perhaps the world adapts remote technology and makes the most of it and as the tyranny of distance is destroyed city centres lose their vibrancy.
To be fair, the business case makes the same error; taking a totally deterministic approach to population growth in Auckland in spite of warnings not to by Statistics NZ. Having said that, the first of their stated objectives is to facilitate that growth.
Is your argument that because we can’t be certain we should do nothing or that you have good reason to believe that the forecasts are wrong? Anyway to quite an important degree we do control this; what we invest in has a huge impact on what shape of city we get. This is the point, if we build the CRL we will get a better city, and a more transit orientated one. Don’t we want this? Well not Hopkins, but doesn’t he live in the South Island anyway?
Yes a councillor for that well known teaming metropolis the Waitaki District.
Whether the forecasts are “wrong” or not is not meaningful. The situation hasn’t arisen, therefore there accuracy cannot be determined.
The Business Case suffers from statistical ineptitude. Statistics NZ advises:
Population growth does not always occur where and when anticipated. Users of population projections should always consider the low- and high-variant series, as well as the medium-variant series, before making any judgement as to which projection series is/are most suitable for their purposes.
Lets see what Cityscape Consultants say in there paper for the Royal Commission (blessed be its name) on Auckland Governance:
3. This paper introduces a further theme, that of uncertainty and risk. This is based in part on Auckland’s dependence on overseas arrivals as a source of population growth (international migration accounted for around two thirds of the gain between 2001 and 2006, although this was unprecedented in recent history) and the difficulty of predicting those trends. Uncertainty is also influenced by changes that take place in residential needs and preferences within an increasingly diverse population.
On that basis the Business Case has fallen at the first hurdle. If I produced a capital submission on that basis it would be thrown back in my face.
The statistical naivety pervades the pages of this blog with Joshua Arbury stating in February 2011 that the projections were “true”. I consider any analysis that doesn’t document a range of population scenarios is an unworthy attempt and this includes most of the road business cases I have seen as well. Anybody want to see how Christchurch’s popultion projects have fared with the benefit of hindsight?
I don’t give a shit about about forecast accuracy this is about what kind of city we want, there are already more than enough people in Auckaland to justify investing in better quality of place after years of dumb spending and infrastructure neglect.
The future is always uncertain, we have to live and act now.
I think MFD raises an interesting point to the extent that transport modelling (which is really just crystal ball gazing) needs to look at a whole range of scenarios rather than one outcome, which is based on a whole pile of assumptions that we never know the details of.
The real question is whether the CRL stacks up under lower growth scenarios. And obviously the same for all other projects.
If you read the Auckland Plan’s development strategy (section D) carefully then you’ll see that the general focus is on squeezing as much growth out of intensification as possible before going into the greenfield areas of expansion. This suggests that under lower growth scenarios the CRL would still be likely to perform well, because growth around the rail stations would still happen.
As for other projects, like widening the southern motorway and building the holiday highway, lower growth scenarios probably kill them.
Talking of ineptitude…. I should read what I write more carefully! There/their
You take the Herald too seriously. It’s a bit of a comic really. The motoring writers are the funniest. Their technical knowledge is abysmal and they appear to have a 200 word vocabulary
Research highly relevant to NZ about the shonky business cases for roasting projects that’s ignore induced demand
“Traffic Forecasts Ignoring Induced Demand: a Shaky Fundament for Cost-Benefit Analyses”
http://www.ejtir.tbm.tudelft.nl/issues/2012_03/pdf/2012_03_02.pdf
Research highly relevant to NZ about the shonky business cases for roading projects that ignore induced demand
“Traffic Forecasts Ignoring Induced Demand: a Shaky Fundament for Cost-Benefit Analyses”
http://www.ejtir.tbm.tudelft.nl/issues/2012_03/pdf/2012_03_02.pdf